Ukraine has reached a critical inflection point: it is now incapacitating or killing roughly as many Russian soldiers as Russia can recruit.
Ukraine is estimated to be taking more than 30,000 Russian troops out of action each month—approaching 400,000 annually. Last year, Russia recruited roughly the same number. Compounding the strain, an estimated 10–15% of Russian personnel have gone AWOL. Ukraine faces its own desertion challenges, but this marks the first year in which Russia’s active fielded force is slightly smaller than before. Moscow could still attempt another mass mobilization, though Putin remains visibly wary of the political risks.
Ukraine’s stated objective is to raise Russian monthly losses to 50,000. At this point, manpower—not equipment or fuel—has become Russia’s most constrained strategic resource. Ukraine has already degraded Russia’s energy leverage to the point that Russia is now an oil importer. In parallel with strikes on refineries, wells, and storage facilities, the U.S. and NATO allies are interdicting suspected illegal Russian oil tankers.
On the battlefield, Ukraine has rapidly evolved its combined-arms drone doctrine. Scout drones fly ahead along roads; when Russian troops are detected, FPV drones are called in to strike. Roads are then cleared of Russian drones that sit idle due to insufficient power to loiter. Ukrainian units deploy suicide ground drones—often covered by machine-gun drones—to ambush vehicles. Explosive drones ram targets directly, while armed drones neutralize Russian drones before they can be deployed. Recently, after running short of armored vehicles, Russian forces reportedly attempted a cavalry charge using horses—only to be cut down by drone-mounted machine guns.
Ukrainian morale has been boosted by the appointment of a new Secretary of Defense in his mid-30s. He previously developed the Diia app, which allowed citizens to interact directly with the government while bypassing corrupt local bureaucracies. His next innovation was applied to the battlefield: gamifying frontline operations. Ukraine had struggled with fragmented targeting priorities across semi-independent units. He introduced a point-based system that rewards confirmed Russian casualties and Ukrainian lives saved. Units can redeem points through an Amazon-like marketplace for equipment. When command priorities shift, the point values shift with them—forcing immediate behavioral alignment, almost like Death Race 2000. The most effective units receive the best equipment, reinforcing success.
Historically, much of Ukraine’s general staff was trained in Russian doctrine, resulting in small, Russian-style units fighting a larger Russian force. With recent leadership changes around Zelensky—following corruption scandals involving longtime associates—there is renewed optimism that Ukraine will lean more heavily into technological and strategic asymmetries.
As Pokrovsk nears encirclement, Ukraine’s strategy of constantly “poking the bee’s nest” becomes clearer. Russian forces there are reportedly suffering losses as high as 20 soldiers for every Ukrainian. Russia has finally removed the general responsible for the sector—one who previously presided over the destruction of several elite Russian marine units.
Meanwhile, Russia has shifted toward making Ukraine’s largest cities effectively unlivable. Ukraine benefited from relatively mild winters in previous years, but this winter has been harsher. Russia is now saturating urban infrastructure and power grids with upgraded, jet-powered Shahed drones that fly faster and carry heavier payloads, signaling a renewed emphasis on strategic terror over battlefield maneuver.